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Conduct of Criminal Trial Proceedings: Amend Article 3 of 
Chapter 8 of Title 17 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
Relating to Conduct of Proceedings, so as to Change Provisions 
Relating to Reversal on Appeal When a Judge Expresses an 
Opinion Regarding Proof in a Criminal Case or as to the Accused’s 
Guilt; Provide for Related Matters; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and 
for Other Purposes 
CODE SECTION: O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (amended) 
BILL NUMBER: SB 99 
ACT NUMBER:  174 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2015 Ga. Laws 1050 
SUMMARY:  The Act provides that if a trial court 
judge expresses an opinion to the jury 
about what has or has not been proven 
as to the guilt of the defendant, the 
judge must give a curative instruction 
or grant a new trial. However, defense 
counsel must object when a judge 
expresses such an opinion. Failure to 
object at trial precludes appellate 
review unless the judge’s opinion was 
plain error that affects the substantial 
right of the parties. If a judge expresses 
an opinion as to the guilt of the 
defendant, the Supreme Court, Court of 
Appeals, or trial court in a motion for a 
new trial must grant the new trial. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2015 
History 
On August 31, 2007, Steven Rouse was found guilty of felony 
murder based on the underlying felony of robbery.1 The prosecution 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. 213, 213, 765 S.E.2d 879, 879 (2014). 
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presented evidence that the defendant beat Scott Gillens to death and 
robbed him on September 3, 2006.2 The evidence presented at trial 
revealed that Melissa and Missy Conaway showed their boyfriends, 
Charles Mellinger and Brian Dewberry, sexual text messages Gillens 
sent them.3 Mellinger and Dewberry initially wanted to “jump” the 
victim, but all four formulated a plan to lure the victim to a 
predetermined location to rob him.4 Dewberry asked his brother 
Steven Rouse, the defendant, for help with the robbery.5 
On September 3, 2006, “Melissa invited the victim to an apartment 
complex near her house in Muscogee County and agreed to have sex 
with him in exchange for cigarettes.”6 “Melissa and [Gillens] later 
went to the store to get the cigarettes while Missy called [Rouse].”7 
Melissa took Gillens to a nearby parking lot where he believed the 
exchange would happen.8 After the victim parked in the lot, “Melissa 
walked away from the victim’s truck.”9 Rouse, Dewberry, and 
Mellinger, waiting nearby, approached.10 “[Rouse] punched the 
victim, placed him in a choke hold, and kicked him in the head and 
throat several times while he lay on the ground.”11 “The victim died 
as a result of injuries to his head and neck resulting in 
asphyxiation.”12 Rouse was arrested later that day and admitted to 
police that he hit and kicked the victim in the head and throat.13 
On appeal, Rouse’s conviction was reversed, even in the face of 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, based on former Code section 
17-8-57.14 The statute stated in its entirety: 
It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or 
in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what 
has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Should 
any judge violate this Code section, the violation shall be held by the 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. 
 3. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 213–14, 765 S.E.2d at 880. 
 4. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 214, 765 S.E.2d at 880. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 214, 765 S.E.2d at 880. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 214–15, 765 S.E.2d at 880–81. 
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Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to be error and the decision in 
the case reversed, and a new trial granted in the court below with 
such directions as the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals may 
lawfully give.15 
Writing for a majority of four Justices on the Georgia Supreme 
Court, Chief Justice Thompson held that “the language of this statute 
is mandatory, thus any violation of [the statute] requires a new trial 
regardless of whether there has been any showing of actual prejudice 
to the defendant.”16 The statutory violation in Rouse’s trial occurred 
during the preliminary jury selection when the judge was instructing 
the jury venire directly.17 More specifically, the trial judge stated, 
“you will be hearing about a case, which is a murder case, that 
happened in Muscogee County, and you’ll be asked questions about 
this case.”18 The Georgia Supreme Court held this statement to 
clearly suggest that venue was established and not in dispute.19 
Venue is a jurisdictional element that must be proven by the State, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is an issue solely within the 
province of the jury.20 Thus, a comment about the location of the 
crime is an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, and the guilty 
verdict was overturned.21 
Justice Nahmias, joined by Justices Blackwell and Hines, filed a 
lengthy dissent.22 Justice Nahmias argued that the statement by the 
trial court about where events occurred should not be viewed in 
isolation; rather, they should be viewed in the context of the trial as a 
whole in order to determine if a “reasonable juror” would interpret 
the judge’s remark as an express opinion on an issue to be decided.23 
Most notably, the dissent called directly on the state legislature to 
reconsider the statute as then written.24 Justice Nahmias reasoned that 
                                                                                                                 
 15. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 16. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 214–15, 765 S.E.2d at 880. Chief Justice Thompson cited Patel v. State, 282 
Ga. 412, 415, 651 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2007), in support of his holding. Patel held that O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 
requires an automatic reversal of a defendant’s conviction if the statute is violated without regard to the 
effect of the violation on the defendant’s substantive rights. Id. 
 17. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 215, 765 S.E.2d at 880. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 215, 765 S.E.2d at 880–81. 
 20. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 215, 765 S.E.2d at 881 (citing Patel, 282 Ga. at 414, 651 S.E.2d at 57–58). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 219–38, 765 S.E.2d at 883–96. 
 23. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 221–22, 765 S.E.2d at 884–85. 
 24. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 233, 765 S.E.2d at 892. 
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the Court’s hands should not be tied to mandatory reversal when a 
comment does not affect the outcome of the proceedings, and the 
defense does not object to the judge’s statement during trial.25 Justice 
Nahmias advocated for the legislature to adopt a “harmless-error 
review” standard as is used in many other trial contexts.26 Justice 
Nahmias concluded by calling the Georgia General Assembly to 
rewrite the statute and remedy the expansive reading of the statute by 
the Court’s majority.27 Such a broad reading will require trial judges 
to carefully pick each word said in front of a jury and will bind an 
appellate court to overturn a verdict from any such comment, even if 
the comment did not affect the outcome of the trial.28 
Bill Tracking of SB 99 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senators John Kennedy (R-18th), Joshua McKoon (R-29th), Burt 
Jones (R-25th), Charlie Bethel (R-54th), Judson Hill (R-32th), and 
Marty Harbin (R-16th) sponsored Senate Bill (SB) 99.29 The Senate 
read the bill for the first time on February 11, 2015.30 The bill was 
assigned to the Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee and favorably 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 220, 765 S.E.2d at 884. Justice Nahmias calls this statute’s “super-plain-error” 
standard of appellate review extremely unusual in Georgia and greater American jurisprudence because 
“it can lead to unjust results.” Id. Justice Nahmias continued, “it is highly probable that the trial court’s 
remark, even if deemed improper, did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdicts, since the State readily 
proved that venue was proper in Muscogee County, the defense never disputed that proof, and Rouse 
otherwise received a full and fair trial.” Id. 
 26. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 237–38, 765 S.E.2d at 895. Justice Nahmias stated that harmless-error works 
well in the context of evidence rules and constitutional protections. Id. 
 27. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 238, 765 S.E.2d at 895. 
Why should we have an automatic-reversal rule when a trial court improperly 
expresses its opinion on whether the evidence has or has not proved a fact, when 
we do not have such a rule when the court improperly admits or excludes the 
evidence that is actually needed to prove that fact? I see no good reason to retain 
the unusual automatic-reversal language of OCGA § 17-8-57 . . . . 
For these reasons, I dissent, and I urge the General Assembly to consider 
repealing the second sentence of OCGA § 17-8-57. 
Id. 
 28. Rouse, 296 Ga. at 234–35, 765 S.E.2d at 893. 
 29. Georgia General Assembly, SB 99, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20152016/SB/99. 
 30. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 99, May 14, 2015. 
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reported by substitute on March 5, 2015.31 The Committee substitute 
included the language from the introduced version regarding the 
contemporaneous objection requirement32 and, if possible, the duty 
on the trial court to cure any violation with an instruction.33 The 
substitute, however, granted the trial court the option to declare a 
mistrial following the objection if the court deems the curative 
instruction will not remedy the prejudice to the defendant.34 The 
Senate read the bill for the second time on March 9, 2015.35 The first 
Senate floor amendment was proposed by Senators Bethel (R-54th), 
Bill Cowsert (R-46th), and Harold Jones II (D-22nd); it removed a 
contemporaneous objection requirement and allowed appellate courts 
wide discretion to rectify violations as “the interests of justice 
requires.”36 This floor amendment failed.37 The bill was read for the 
third time on March 11, 2015, and passed the Senate the same day by 
a vote of 39 to 16.38 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representative Bert Reeves (R-34th) sponsored SB 99 in the 
House.39 The bill was first read on March 13, 2015, and was assigned 
to the House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee.40 The House read the 
bill a second time on March 18, 2015.41 The House Judiciary Non-
Civil Committee favorably reported the bill by substitute on March 
26, 2015.42 The House Committee’s substitute clarified that an 
objection at trial is not needed to preserve appellate review when 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. 
 32. SB 99 (SCS), § 1, p. 1, ln. 19–21, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assem. Failure to object “preclude[s] appellate 
review, unless such violation constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties.” Id. 
§ 1, p. 1, ln. 24–26. 
 33. See id. § 1, p. 1, ln. 21–23. 
 34. See id. § 1, p. 1, ln. 22–23. The introduced version of SB 99 did not give the trial judge the 
option to declare a mistrial. See SB 99, as introduced, § 1, p. 1, ln. 18–22, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 35. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 99, May 14, 2015. 
 36. Failed Senate Floor Amendment to SB 99, introduced by Sen. Bethel (R-54th), Sen. Cowsert (R-
46th), Sen. Jones II (D-22nd), Mar. 11, 2015. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 99 (Mar. 11, 2015). 
 39. Georgia General Assembly, SB 99, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20152016/SB/99. 
 40. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 99, May 14, 2015. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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there is plain error that “affects the substantive rights of the 
parties.”43 The House substitute further preserved the protection 
against a judge’s opinion regarding guilt in the former Code section 
stating that the trial court, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme 
Court shall grant a motion for a new trial when a judge expresses an 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused.44 Representative B.J. Pak (R-
108th) successfully proposed a floor amendment to replace the word 
“contemporaneous” with “timely.”45 The House passed the bill on 
April 2, 2015, by a vote of 169 to 0,46 and the Senate agreed to the 
bill as amended by the House by a vote of 46 to 7.47 SB 99 was sent 
to Governor Nathan Deal (R) on April 9, 2015, and signed into law 
on May 6, 2015.48 
The Act 
The Act amends Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 17 of the Official 
Code of Georgia Annotated, related to conduct of proceedings 
generally, and specifically related to an expression or intimation of 
opinion by a judge as to matters the parties are required to prove or as 
to the guilt of the accused.49 
The new subsection (a)(1) of Code section 17-8-57 provides, “[i]t 
is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to 
express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a 
fact at issue has or has not been proved . . . .”50 The Act maintains the 
original language of the Code section that the judge cannot express 
his opinion as to the “guilt of the accused.”51 Subsection (a)(1) also 
clarifies when a judge is prohibited from expressing an opinion about 
facts at issue.52 Former Code section 17-8-57 prohibited a judge from 
                                                                                                                 
 43. SB 99 (HCS), § 1, p. 1, ln. 22–25, 2015 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 44. Id. § 1, p. 2, ln. 26–30. 
 45. SB 99 (HCSFA), § 1, p. 1, ln. 20–21, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assem.; SB 99 (AM 29 2468), 2015 Ga. 
Gen. Assem. 
 46. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 99 (Apr. 2, 2015). 
 47. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 99 (Apr. 2, 2015). 
 48. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 99, May 14, 2015. 
 49. 2015 Ga. Laws 1050, at 1050–51. 
 50. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
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expressing an opinion as to “what has or has not been proved.”53 
Subsection (a)(1) of the Act instead narrows prohibited opinions to 
“fact[s] at issue”; thus, the subsection restricts the scope of topics on 
which the judge is proscribed from opining about to the jury.54 
The Act adds subsection (a)(2) to Code section 17-8-57, which 
requires a party who is alleging a violation of subsection (a)(1) to 
make a “timely objection.”55 The “timely objection” is subject to 
three requirements. First, the party making the objection must specify 
that the judge is allegedly violating subsection (a)(1).56 Second, the 
party making the objection must specify the grounds for such 
objection.57 Finally, the objecting party must express the specific 
grounds for the objection outside the jury’s hearing and presence.58 If 
the objection outlined in subsection (a)(2) is sustained, the court must 
“give a curative instruction to the jury or declare a mistrial, if 
appropriate.”59 The “curative instruction” language is a departure 
from the former version of Code section 17-8-57, which required the 
Georgia Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals to reverse 
the case and grant a new trial if the judge violated the section.60 
The Act adds subsection (b) to Code section 17-8-57, which 
specifies that a “failure to make a timely objection,” except as 
provided in subsection (c), will preclude appellate review.61 
However, the Act carves out an exception that allows for appellate 
review where the violation of subsection (a)(2) constitutes a “plain 
error which affects substantive rights of the parties.”62 Accordingly, 
appellate review is not precluded where a violation of the Act affects 
the substantive rights of the parties, even if the party did not make a 
timely objection.63 This is a departure from the form Code section 
17-8-57, which provided that the Supreme Court or the Court of 
                                                                                                                 
 53. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2013). 
 54. Compare id., with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 55. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Compare O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2013), with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 61. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(b) (Supp. 2015). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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Appeals must deem any violation of this statute a reversible error 
regardless of whether the party objected at trial.64 
Finally, the Act adds subsection (c) to Code section 17-8-57 to 
include an exception to the general principle that a failure to make a 
timely objection will preclude appellate review.65 Subsection (c) 
provides that when a judge expresses an opinion as to “the guilt of 
the accused,” the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the trial 
court in a motion for a new trial must grant a new trial.66 Subsection 
(c) illustrates the divergence between statements made by the judge 
related to a fact at issue and statements made by the judge related to 
the guilt of the accused.67 As for statements related to a fact at issue, 
discussed in subsection (a)(2), if the judge sustains the timely 
objection, then he must give a curative instruction.68 Conversely, for 
statements made by the judge related to the guilt of the accused, as 
discussed in subsection (c), the judge must grant a new trial, even if a 
party did not make a timely objection.69 
Analysis 
Intended Consequences and Public Policy 
The Act was introduced to respond to the problem exhibited in 
Rouse where the Georgia Supreme Court was required to overturn a 
conviction because of a single statement made by a judge during the 
course of the trial.70 The Act purports to address the inefficiencies 
caused by the mandatory language in the Code section, which 
required the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals to grant a new 
                                                                                                                 
 64. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2013). 
 65. See O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(c) (Supp. 2015). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Compare O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(b) (Supp. 2015) (generally barring appellate review unless there is 
plain error or a contemporaneous objection), with O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(c) (Supp. 2015) (requiring 
reversal upon review). 
 68. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 69. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(c) (Supp. 2015). 
 70. See Telephone Interview with Sen. John Kennedy (R-18th) (June 15, 2015) [hereinafter Kennedy 
Interview]. Although the Act was not specific to the Rouse case, the Rouse case was an example of the 
practical consequences of the mandatory “shall” language in the previous version of the Act. Id. Senator 
Kennedy expressed concern that the Georgia Supreme Court felt that it had to grant a reversal based on 
the language of former O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57, notwithstanding the fact that the reversal seemed 
“wasteful” and “inefficient.” Id. 
8
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trial whenever a judge expresses his or her opinion.71 Accordingly, 
the Act incorporates a categorical approach to resolving the issues 
surrounding judicial statements expressing an opinion as to whether a 
fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the 
accused.72 
First, the Act addresses the issue of when a judge makes a 
statement related to a fact that has not been proven at trial, as 
exemplified in Rouse, where a judge made a statement about the 
venue of the case.73 The Act requires counsel to make a timely 
objection to such statements, and failure to object precludes appellate 
review absent plain error affecting the substantive rights of the 
parties.74 Thus, the Act places a burden on counsel to object to the 
statement, and it allows the judge to provide a curative instruction to 
the jurors.75 
Second, the Act addresses the issue of judges expressing an 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused.76 The Act requires the Supreme 
Court, Court of Appeals, or the trial court in a motion for a new trial 
to grant a new trial for such statements by a judge.77 Statements 
related to the guilt or innocence of the accused are of such a nature 
that a curative instruction cannot fix the problem, so the Act 
mandates a new trial in the interest of fairness.78 This amendment 
maintains the original mandatory new trial requirement but limits the 
statements subject to the requirement.79 Overall, the Act draws a 
clear distinction as to treatment of the two categories of statements.80 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (Supp. 2015). 
 73. See id.; Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. 213, 215, 765 S.E.2d 879, 880–81 (2014). 
 74. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(b) (Supp. 2015). 
 75. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(2) (Supp. 2015). 
 76. See O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(c) (Supp. 2015). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; see Kennedy Interview, supra note 70. 
 79. Kennedy Interview, supra note 70. 
 80. Id. Senator Kennedy noted that in the event of statements that truly need to garner a new trial, 
like statements regarding the guilt of the accused, a new trial would be available, even absent a timely 
objection. Id. However, a judge’s statement about facts in issue, like venue in Rouse, can be resolved 
through a curative instruction, thereby avoiding a second trial. Id. 
9
et al.: SB 99 – Criminal Procedure: Conduct of Criminal Trial Proceedings
Published by Reading Room, 2015
100 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
Practical Considerations 
The Act implicates two practical concerns for trial counsel and 
judges: the definition of “timely” for judges and the process of 
objecting for trial counsel. The first practical consideration concerns 
the timing of the objection. The version of the bill that the Senate 
introduced and passed required a “contemporaneous objection,” but 
the final Act requires a “timely objection.”81 Some legislators wished 
the Act maintained the “contemporaneous” phrase, as it is a more 
ascertainable standard.82 Senator John Kennedy (R-18th), the sponsor 
of the bill, expressed concern over the word “timely” for two main 
reasons.83 First, courts will struggle determining whether an objection 
was timely.84 For example, on appeal a judge will read the statute and 
see that it requires a “timely” objection, but the statute does not 
define what “timely” means in context of the Act.85 Accordingly, 
judges will have to look to other sources of law and apply it to the 
Act.86 
Moreover, the purpose of the timely objection is to allow the trial 
judge to give a curative instruction in the moment.87 If an objection, 
however, is deemed “timely” when it is raised later in the same day, 
the next day, or at any point during the trial, a curative instruction 
serves as a reminder of the statement to the jurors.88 Consequently, 
the later repetition during the curative instruction may cause jurors to 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Compare SB 99, as introduced, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A.§ 17-8-57(a)(2) (Supp. 
2015). 
 82. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 70. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. Senator Kennedy anticipates uncertainty with regard to discerning the definition of “timely” 
for circumstances in which the trial lawyer does not object immediately to the judge’s statement. Id. 
 87. Id. The timely objection is a departure from the previous version of Code section 17-8-57, which 
required an automatic reversal, but the timely objection allows the judge to give a curative instruction 
and avoid a reversal and new trial. Id. 
 88. See Telephone Interview with Sen. Charlie Bethel (R-54th) (June 16, 2015) [hereinafter Bethel 
Interview]. Senator Kennedy, during debate regarding whether to use the word “contemporaneous” or 
“timely,” stated that courts and lawyers will have difficultly evaluating whether an objection was timely. 
Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee Meeting, Mar. 25, 2015 at 27 min. 14 sec. 
(remarks by Sen. John Kennedy (R-18th)), http://original.livestream.com/gahln132/ 
video?clipId=pla_7a151892-2971-482a-8ce5-f3e4870d2886 [hereinafter House Video]. Ultimately, the 
goal of the objection requirement is to bring to the court’s attention the improper statement so it can be 
dealt with by a curative instruction, and less stringent objection requirements will hinder this goal. Id. 
10
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place more weight on the judge’s statement, as jurors often rely 
heavily upon judges’ statements.89 However, the Act requires counsel 
to inform the court of the specific objection and explain the grounds 
for such objection outside the presence of the jury.90 This 
requirement will limit exposing a judge’s statements to the jury 
regarding facts at issue or the guilt of the accused. 
The second practical consideration associated with this Act is the 
appropriate process for objecting to a judge’s statement during trial. 
The Act requires a timely objection, and the first opportunity for 
counsel to make such objection will likely be when a judge is 
instructing the jury or addressing the court.91 Accordingly, counsel 
might be hesitant to interrupt the judge when he is speaking, as such 
conduct might cast counsel in a negative light to the jury.92 Although 
this objection process is typical in courtrooms, the Act is related to 
objecting to a judge’s statement, rather than objecting to a witness 
testifying on the stand or to counsel questioning a witness.93 
Although practical concerns over the decorum of counsel objecting to 
a judge’s own comments are present, the Act does not deviate from 
the traditional objection process observed by courts.94 
Mary Emily Hearons & Maxwell Jones 
 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Bethel Interview, supra note 88. Senator Bethel stated that, from a practical standpoint, jurors 
focus intently when a judge speaks, and if a judge, when giving a curative instruction, repeats his 
statement and asks the jury to disregard such statement, the jurors might actually consider that statement 
more during deliberation. Id. Senator Bethel expressed concern about the repeated nature of the 
objection process. Id. The jurors will hear the objection, the grounds for the objection, and the statement 
multiple times. Id. First, the jurors will hear counsel’s initial objection, thereby drawing attention to the 
judge’s statement. Id. Second, the jurors will hear counsel explain the grounds for such objection. Id. 
Third, the jurors will hear the judge’s curative instruction where he asks the jurors to disregard his 
previous comment, thereby repeating the specific comment. Id. 
 90. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57(a)(2) (Supp. 2015). In response to Representative Kendrick’s practical 
concerns about the objection requirement, Senator Kennedy explained that the original objection will be 
made in front of the jurors; however, the explanation and discussion between counsel and the judge will 
occur outside of the presence of the jury. House Video, supra note 88, at 5 min. 40 sec. (remarks by Sen. 
John Kennedy (R-18th)). 
 91. House Video, supra note 87, at 12 min. 15 sec. (remarks by Rep. B.J. Pak (R-108th)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Kennedy Interview, supra note 70. The objection requirement included in the Act is not 
inconsistent with the typical civil procedure demands whereupon counsel must make an objection or it is 
deemed waived for purposes of appellate review. Id. 
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